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ABSTRACT 
This article is a recognition-theoretical reading of a research-study on pre-theoretical 
understandings of human rights amongst university students as ways to logically anchor agential 
options for student social activism. The study shows that the expected legal and political 
constructions of human rights are discursively dominant. However, from the overall results of the 
study, it appears students have more complex pre-theoretical understandings of human rights 
from which they derive justice-orientations as sources for activism. We conclude this has 
deliberative implications for human rights praxes.  




This article is the second article of a series that captures our ongoing research on contemporary 
expressions of the notion of rights and citizenship in university settings.1 The research project 
is steered by the idea of transformative student citizenship.2 In the first paper, ‘Rights, 
regulation and recognition’ (Keet and Nel 2016), we report on the first phase of our research 
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project that probed the following question: ‘Why do successive groups of student leaders feel 
misrecognised within university arrangements and practices that are meant to broaden 
democratic spaces as far as their participation is concerned?’ The findings put our assumptions 
relating to recognition as a function of democratic participation and the justice-making potential 
of rights within formal institutions in doubt. Futhermore, the exercise of rights and democratic 
participation do not necessarily contribute to recognitive justice within university settings; 
though we presuppose there is a positive link between the exercise of rights and recognitive 
justice. 
This article reflects on the second phase of the research project and focuses on students’ 
framing of human rights in higher education institutions, building on the first phase of our 
inquiry by exploring the apparent contradictory idea of human rights as un/freedoms insofar as 
human rights both facilitate and constrain the agential capacities of students. The mapping of 
the inconsistencies and contradictions between rights and recognition in the first phase (Keet 
and Nel 2016) provides the basis for articulating our main research question in the second phase. 
As the conception of rights in its codified forms expands to ‘supposedly’ facilitate agency and 
empowerment, we pose these questions: Why do students feel increasingly trapped by 
smothered activisms in seemingly rights-friendly policy environments; and secondly, from 
where, if anywhere, do students mobilise alternative sources for social activism? To respond to 
these questions, we designed this phase of the study around pre-theoretical understandings of 
both human rights and citizenship to probe the standpoints that students may hold as they 
engage with these concepts and its expressions within the university.  
 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
In an account of the first phase of our study in ‘Rights, regulation and recognition’ (Keet and 
Nel 2016), we briefly reflected on the historical racialised arrangements in South African higher 
education, as imported into the present. We also sketchily engaged with the transformation 
trajectory of the University of the Free State (UFS), a historically White-Afrikaner university. 
As we reflect on the first phase of the study it became apparent that human rights are 
increasingly experienced and viewed as constitutive of over-regulated practices, a point 
potently made by Honig (2001, 800). However, the value of human rights as a force in service 
of social justice cannot summarily be discounted.3 Rather, we are called upon to explore the 
social processes by which its activist potential is weakened, so as to retreat it, which will be 
expanded upon later.  
Student participation, a key element of university citizenship, includes transformational 
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and activist dimensions. The international and national history of student participation, student 
governance and student politics within universities have been analysed in various studies 
(Luescher 2015; Luescher, Klemenčič and Jowi 2016). Against this backdrop we argue that 
student participation in university life may displace the social justice project for which it was 
designed. The scholarly puzzle that emerged in phase one of the study relates to how student 
leaders frame their experiences as ‘acting out scripts’ in an ‘overregulated space’. We thus 
highlighted the need to rethink student citizenship against the backdrop of the university as an 
institution embodied in techniques of regulation and governmentality.  
In phase two of the study, we raise the stakes for our inquiry. Looking beyond the 
challenges of ‘overregulation’ and questioning the shared misplaced truth of the contingent link 
between human rights and the expansion of democratic practice (ibid.) through the prism of 
rights critiques, we not only explore how rights-friendly policy environments seemingly 
smothers social activism, but we also consider the alternative sources for radical action that 
students mobilise. The findings from this phase of the study show that though legal, political 
and policy constructions are dominant in students’ understandings on human rights, complex 
pre-theoretical orientations feature strongly in students’ responses from which they draw 
alternative resources for activism. This reliance has daunting yet exciting implications for 
human rights praxes in university settings.  
 
CONTEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMES 
The policy architecture of student governance in higher education is rooted in the principles of 
human rights and democracy, pleated into what is generally regarded as South Africa’s 
overarching socio-legal scheme of ‘transformative constitutionalism’; though it is probably 
more accurate to describe it as a bare form of idolatry that results in ‘non-thinking in the name 
of the normative’ (Butler 2010, 136). The Constitution sets up ‘normative’ rights-bearing-
subjects that stream our entire political consciousness without questioning what the norm is 
‘according to which the subject is produced who then becomes the presumptive “ground” of 
normative debate’ (Butler 2010, 139. The human-rights-subject, produced within the pages of 
the South African Bill of Rights (chapter two of the 1996 Constitution) and the Constitution 
(Government of South Africa 1993; 1996), and supposedly estranged from the pre-1994 South 
African conception of the apartheid citizen, was always central to the construction of human 
rights idolatry (Keet 2015) in post-1994 South Africa. Both human rights and transformative 
constitutionalism converged into a totalising narrative of progress and transformation amidst a 
landscape littered with broken human rights promises, especially ‘widespread poverty’, 
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‘extreme inequality’, poor educational outcomes, societal exclusion, to name a few (National 
Planning Commission 2011).  
Constitutional mechanisms emerged as the ‘formal framers’ of the rights discourse post-
1994. Thus, a massively productive project on developing and enacting social legislation took 
shape,4 confirming that constitutional and human rights discourses were at the apex of a 
‘designed’ everyday public consciousness. Human rights became the official language of 
transition of law, politics and life in South Africa paving the way for transformative legislation 
in each and every social sector, including higher education and higher education governance. 
The rights-based policy architecture in higher education with provisions for the democratic 
participation of students, is rooted in this brief post-1994 history. These policy developments 
could not foresee the global elaboration of human rights into regimes of control and 
governmentality over the past two decades.  
The ‘regulatory’ function of rights was already evident in the first phase of our study, 
mandating its retreatment. Retreat has two meanings here, as according to Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy (Sparks 1997, xxvii). First, it may mean ‘pulling back’ or to ‘withdraw’; and second 
– the meaning we use in this article by borrowing from the Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1997) 
essays in Retreating the Political, it may alternatively mean the ‘traversing and displacing’ of 
the ‘political’ and its ‘meaning’ (Sparks 1997, xxvii) and retracing the contours of which ‘actual 
conditions would need to be reinvented’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 139). In a similar 
vein, ‘Retreating rights’, as we have titled this article, intimates traversing and displacing rights 
and its meanings and retracing its contours outside the scope of a proceduralism that is linked 
to an increasingly administered society. Such a retreat ‘must allow, or even impose, the tracing 
anew of the stakes of the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 131), the stakes of 
human rights, so as to release something or make something appear (ibid.) for us to be slightly 
freed from the ‘blinding obviousness’ (ibid., 114) of human rights. In this article, we attempt to 
retreat rights through exploring pre-theoretical human rights praxes in relation to student 
activism and to retrace the stakes embedded in its codified forms as a way to liberate us from 
its blinding obviousness that disallows praxes and traverses rights-based proceduralism.  
Now that we have expounded on the meanings that we employ around the phrase 
retreating rights, the next logical step is to frame our understanding of pre-theoretical praxis to 
make the interpretive scheme of our study intelligible. Adapting from Honneth (2007a), Allen 
(2016, 80) defines pre-theoretical praxis as ‘the empirical experiences and attitudes of social 
actors, particularly their experiences of injustice’. Thus, the need to retreat rights stems from 
its possible ineffectiveness to respond to empirical experiences of injustice. A growing body of 
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knowledge, which we refer to as human rights critiques, is emerging that more or less has such 
retreatment in mind. We will return to these critiques later on. 
The conceptual frames of our research study took shape during the informal discussions 
with students and student leaders that consisted of twenty-eight bilateral and seven group 
encounters between November 2011 and December 2012. The major issues that students 
formulated during these informal discussions suggested that despite the democratisation of 
university spaces through human rights related policies, the intuitive justice expectations that 
students have are not adequately facilitated by rights-based regimes. In other words, the 
practical expression of rights does not necessarily correlate with recognition. In May 2013, 
therefore, we conceptualised our study around a critical engagement with Honneth’s theory of 
recognition (1995a; 1995b and 2007b) and imported particular understandings of student 
participation, citizenship and democratic practice. We also employed Bourdieu’s (1984) 
notions of field and habitus and Foucault’s (1977) concept of governmentality to make better 
sense of the constraints on agency, facilitated by rights, as expressed in students’ experiences 
of ‘acting out scripts’ in an ‘overregulated space’. 
The demands to retreat rights and retrace its contours were already intimated in the first 
phase of the study. Seemingly, the sources for such retreat reside in students’ pre-theoretical 
understandings of justice as a promise of human rights and democratisation. As we argued 
earlier, therefore, we employ Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s (1997) concept of retreat and the 
notion of pre-theoretical praxes and their role in Honneth’s recognition theory. We locate this 
conceptual scheme in critical theory broadly understood as an ‘interdisciplinary social theory 
with emancipatory intent’ (Zurn 2015, 4). The emancipatory intent of our study is linked to the 
objective to trace afresh the stakes of human rights so as to be marginally unregulated by its 
‘blinding obviousness’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 114).  
According to Habermas’s understanding of critical theory, the pre-theoretical resource for 
emancipation, is assumed in communicative action. ‘Social pathologies can be understood as 
forms of manifestation of systematically distorted communication’ (Honneth and Joas 1991, 
229). Social ills can thus be linked to processes that compromise the ability of human beings to 
reach communicative understanding. For Honneth (2007a, 70) pre-theoretical resources for 
justice claims do not reside in communicative action, but rather, they exist in ‘moral experiences 
as feelings of disrespect’ (ibid., 71) because moral experiences are ‘not aroused by restriction 
of linguistic capabilities, but by a violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation’ (ibid., 
70). Human beings do not encounter each other on the basis of communicative understanding; 
but rather, they have reciprocal expectations of receiving moral recognition as moral persons 
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(see Honneth 2007a, 69–72).  
Zurn’s (2015, 45) summary of Honneth’s conceptual basis suggests three forms of 
‘intersubjective recognition’5 – love (friendship), legal relations (rights), and solidarity 
(achievement) – corresponding to three forms of practical self-understanding – ‘self-
confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem’ – that underscore his critical social theory of 
recognition. Furthermore, intersubjective recognition also provides the architecture for his 
reconstructive, pluralist theory of justice: justice of needs (love, friendship); justice of 
deliberative equality (rights); and justice of achievement (solidarity) (Honneth 2012, 49). These 
principles of justice, in Honneth’s argumentation, are empirically present in the everyday praxis 
of agents, intuitively so (ibid.). In the first phase of our research, it seems that student leaders’ 
participation is particularly rooted on the first level of intersubjective recognition, a justice of 
needs (love, friendship); whilst the justices of deliberative equality and achievement are 
constrained by various factors (Keet and Nel 2016). Though Honneth (2007b) is acutely aware 
of the limits of rights, the contemporary role of rights in over-regulatory practices which 
hampers a justice of deliberative equality does not feature substantively in his critique of rights. 
This gap does not necessarily render parts of his recognition theory problematic or invalid; 
rather, it suggests that we will be better served to focus simultaneously on pre-theoretical 
understandings of rights and its codified forms. Consequently, the legal relations within which 
rights are captured and captive, consistently require a return to its non-juridical, normative 
foundations. Otherwise, rights tend to amplify proceduralism as the only mode of engagement 
and participation which is a pattern we identified that underscores findings in the first two 
phases of our study. The alternatives embedded within imaginations that are freed from the 
blinding obviousness of rights are cut off from their emergence.  
We assume these imaginations are located within a pre-theoretical understanding of 
human rights. Students frame the justice-making potential of rights on a pre-theoretical level 
contingent on its prospects to contribute to reciprocal recognition. Students revealed that they 
also apply such frames in relation to the human rights codifications that have become the major 
orders of these justice-claims nationally and globally. The central puzzle for us then is to 
decipher whether the students may have the resources for social activism somewhere between 
the interaction of pre-theoretical and coded expressions of human rights. This activism, it seems 
from the first and second phases of the study, is generally constrained by human-rights-related 
proceduralism which makes human rights prone to be overtaken by new events (Honig 2001, 
800). Rights, as a language, therefore, that aims at critiquing social injustice must (of necessity) 
be distrustful of its role in obscuring the very same injustices that it wants to address by 
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returning, time after time, to its pre-theoretical source; ‘to give dead rights, live futures’ (ibid.).  
In summary, the conceptual frame comes together in the following way. Honneth’s theory 
of recognition (1995a; 1995b; 2007b), within which rights as legal relations are central, guides 
the research project. Given the fact that rights-based proceduralism emerged, during the first 
phase and second phase of the study, as constraining on student social activism, the need to 
renew rights became a principal concern. We thus mobilise Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s 
(1997) notion of retreat as a basis to think such renewal. Since there is a general assumption 
that rights advance agency, we employ Bourdieu’s (1984) notions of field and habitus and 
Foucault’s (1977) concept of governmentality to make better sense of the restrictions on agency 
from a rights-perspective.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As components of an activist enterprise, retreatment and renewal of human rights are at the 
heart of this study, and they are probed as follows: If the emancipatory capacity of codified 
rights and the contingent link between human rights and the expansion of democratic practice 
are already empirically under question in the first phase of the study, where, if at all, are the 
alternative sources for human rights social activism located? The design of this study aims to 
examine this question, focusing on human rights understandings.  
We regard our research as an exploratory study which followed a qualitative-interpretive 
research approach in the form of a stop-and-ask survey design. A team of sixteen student 
fieldworkers were trained in research ethics, data gathering skills in the stop-and-ask mode and 
the data gathering protocol used in this study. The fieldworkers also provided valuable inputs 
on how to improve the data gathering protocol, which consisted of four parts. In the first part, 
the student participants in the study were asked to provide anonymous biographical details of 
themselves. An open-ended question section served as the second part in which participants had 
described what ‘being human’ means to them. In the third part, participants were asked to 
numerically rank three rights presented in a table most important to them, what they thought 
the first three rights in the Bill of Rights are, and they had to choose three rights least important 
to them. In the fourth part of the protocol, participants were expected to write down the four 
challenges they regarded as most important in South Africa and at the University of the Free 
State (Bloemfontein campus), respectively. For a duration of four months, fieldworkers 
solicited consent for student participation at the university. A total of three hundred forty-eight 
protocols were returned to and processed by a research data manager.  
Simple enumeration was used to manage the biographical data of the first and third parts 
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of the protocol to summarise the data. The second and fourth parts of the protocol, which 
required participants to provide their own responses, were managed by thematic analysis. The 
analysis phase was followed by four focus group discussions that expanded upon the emerging 
thematic areas.  
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSES 
The study expectedly shows that the legal and politically codified constructions of human rights 
are discursively dominant in students’ minds. However, it appears, from the overall results of 
this phase of the study that students have more complex pre-theoretical understandings of 
human rights from which they derive justice-oriented normative standpoints as the basis for 
their understandings and applications of activism. Formal, codified human rights, therefore, 
play less of an agential function within student activism if detached from and unguided by pre-
theoretical human rights praxes. The implications for human rights praxes are obvious, and we 
discuss this later.  
To study pre-theoretical understandings of human rights of university students is a 
daunting task given the over-proximity of the human rights language in our national political 
discourse. As a result of socialisation and educative processes, students demonstrated that they 
encountered the formalistic notions of human rights over an extended period of time. For 
instance, students showed they could readily list the first three rights in the Bill of Rights in the 
South African Constitution: the rights to equality, human dignity and life. (Government of 
South Africa 1996). Two hundred and seventy-four of the three hundred and forty-eight 
participants, representing 90.2 per cent of the total number of participants, specify ‘equality’ as 
the most important human right in their understanding. ‘Human dignity’ followed as the second 
most popular response at 75.6 per cent. The other rights did not attract more than 43 per cent of 
participants’ ranking them as most important. The first three rights in the Bill of Rights were 
indicated in the following averaged sequence from first to third in terms of importance: 
‘Equality’ (82.8%), ‘life’ (76.2%) and ‘human dignity’ (57.2%). These figures challenge the 
general assumption that South Africans have limited knowledge of rights and other 
constitutional provisions (Hodgson 2014) at least as far as human rights knowledge among 
university students is concerned.  
Nevertheless, one can claim that ‘equality’ and ‘human dignity’ are two rights with pre-
theoretical links that align well with Honneth’s three forms of ‘intersubjective recognition’6 
discussed earlier, as well as his pluralist theory of justice: justice of needs (love, friendship); 
justice of deliberative equality (rights); and justice of achievement (solidarity) (Honneth 2012, 
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49). We can also link the findings on the rights to ‘equality’ and ‘human dignity’ to Habermas’s 
(2012) exposition of the centrality of the concept of ‘human dignity’ that provides human rights 
retrospectively with moral force. The ‘outrage of the humiliated at the violation of their human 
dignity’ (Habermas 2012, 75), interpreted by Honneth (1995b) as feelings of social disrespect, 
precedes and sublates the codification of human rights. ‘Sublation’ here is used in the Hegelian 
sense of aufheben meaning to ‘preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cease, to put 
an end to’ (Palm 2009, 8). These two meanings function simultaneously; affirming and 
disclaiming human rights at one and the same time. This approach is one way in which rights 
can be reinvested with social justice potential. Also, the centrality of ‘equality’ and ‘dignity’ in 
students’ responses may also signify, as Chatterjee (2004) would argue, a desire to be 
simultaneously inside and outside of human rights codifications. If human rights praxes, 
ingrained in formalised human rights provisions, partly contribute to the misrecognitions of the 
majority of poor people across the world, then moral feelings of disrespect, of having one’s 
dignity violated, will always already have the capacity to reinvest a social activist capacity in 
human rights. This argument was particularly pronounced in the focus groups discussions. 
To further probe their pre-theoretical understandings of human rights students were asked 
to, in an open-ended style, write the concepts down that for them describe the ‘human’ in human 
rights. ‘Care and empathy for the other’ (35%), having rights and responsibilities (19.5%), and 
‘respect for self and others’ (19%) are the three major themes that have emerged. If we cluster 
‘care and empathy for the other’ and ‘respect for self and others’, then more than 54 per cent of 
participants’ intuitive notions of human rights hover within the vicinity of ‘human dignity’. It 
also points to ‘recognition’ as generated by and dependent on intersubjective relations amongst 
human beings, a logic that lines up well with both Habermas’s and Honneth’s interpretive 
schemes. The same goes for ‘rights and responsibilities’ as central to the ‘human’ in human 
rights.  
In the four focus group discussions, students were encouraged to reflect on their 
knowledge of human rights in relation to the challenges they experienced at the university. In 
terms of the survey, 40 per cent regard ‘racial discrimination’ as the major challenge, whilst 22 
per cent think that socio-economic inequalities are the principal issue on the university campus. 
Combining these figures places ‘equality’ as the key organising theme for 62 per cent of the 
participants who framed the key contestations in their everyday lives as student citizens. 
Nevertheless, when probed as to why such patterns are not employed to mobilise for social 
activism, students tend to argue that rights are imprisoned by governmentality; a theme that we 
pursued in ‘Rights, regulation, recognition’ (Keet and Nel 2016). In a sense, retrospectively 
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speaking, the leading segment of the student protests between 2015 and 2016 rested on demands 
for equality, dignity and recognition. These demands were performed, not through formal 
human rights notions, but through human rights outsides as an affective, morally-charged, non-
juridical discourse which includes testing the plasticity between proceduralist legality and non-
proceduralist illegality. These findings suggest that students have the retreatment of rights in 
mind; ‘to give dead rights, live futures’ (Honig 2001, 800). There are four themes emerging 
from the findings.  
 
• First, though Honneth does not have a strong critique of rights in mind in his recognition 
theory, the study shows that his insistence on a pre-theoretical source for indignation 
rooted in the social dynamics of disrespect (Honneth 1994; 2007a) points in the direction 
of such critique from the need for the retreatment of rights stem.  
• Second, though codified rights are strongly integrated into students’ conceptions of 
justice, they are well aware of how it augments governmentality and thus either smother 
or steer social activism.  
• Third, the centrality of equality and human dignity in students’ pre-theoretical framings 
of human rights opens up the possibilities to continuously reinvest it with an activist 
potential.  
• Fourth, students simultaneously affirm and disclaim rights; they want to be inside and 




The findings of the study suggest that the muting effects of rights can be countered by bringing 
into play the normative conceptions of justice that are always already present in pre-theoretical 
praxes as a revitalising resource for human rights work. However, it would require a serious 
rethinking of global human rights praxes; one in which human rights critiques are given more 
prominence. Thus, though codified human rights are clearly central in students’ conception of 
social activism, it is the critiques of rights that can slice open the pathways for rights to 
consistently return to its pre-theoretical basis. This understanding brings us to the first of the 
themes emerging from the study – the critique of rights. 
The critique of rights has a long history but its substance has escaped contemporary human 
rights praxes. In 1789, Bentham famously dismissed rights as ‘simple nonsense: natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, – nonsense upon stilts’ in 1776 (cited in Gündoğdu 
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2015, 12). Madlingozi (2014) advances three categories of critiques against human rights 
discourses. First, the Marxist and neo-Marxist critique holds that ‘legalism’ can induce a false 
consciousness whereby radical demands are transmuted into [sterile] ‘human rights’ claims. 
Second, the critique on a tactical level argues that ‘in liberal democracy the human rights 
discourse has so much currency as the only legible script of emancipation that once deployed, 
inevitably, it over-shadows other radical discourses that speak to problems of political 
economy, etc.’ (ibid.). The third category of critiques suggests that ‘in historically white 
supremacist societies, Euro-American modernist constitutions like that of South Africa simply 
perpetuates whiteness as a system of privilege’ (ibid.). 
Human rights critiques also feature in Arendt’s philosophical corpus, as discussed in 
Villa’s (2000) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt. Two key elements of her critique 
are the absence of the right to have rights and the fact that such rights cannot be considered ‘as 
substance, but only as a necessary precondition of political freedom’ (Villa 2000, 223). Other 
types of critique are found in this succinct summary below by Gündoğdu (2015, 12):  
 
Some critics see the discourse of human rights, especially as it is utilised in the new practice of 
international humanitarian intervention, as a distinct type of neo-imperialism. Some others 
highlight more subtle forms of political power at work in this discourse and suggest that human 
rights subject us to the very state power from which they promise to protect us. What is more 
troubling, they contend, is that this hegemonic discourse has such a strong hold on our political 
imagination that it has become almost impossible to invent alternative forms of politics that can 
bring to light different understandings of equality, freedom, justice, and emancipation. 
 
In line with these categories of critique, Balibar (2013, 18) suggests that human rights can 
maintain standard politics ‘only on the condition of being radically revisited’. This argument 
supports the contention here to retreat rights. In addition, human rights critiques have been 
classified by Schippers (2016) as ‘human rights purported regulatory, disciplinary and 
exclusionary effects; ... [the] anthroprocentric assumptions underpinning rights discourse; ... 
[and its] predilection for “jurocratic rule” at the expense of democratic practices’. In response 
to these critiques, a growth in critical human rights studies is taking root (Columbia Law School 
2016;7 Douzinas 2013;8 Madlingozi 2014; Schippers 2016) a welcome development in all 
respects. 
Far from being dismissive of rights or anti-rights, human rights critiques appear to carry 
the prospects to retreat (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 139), recraft (Honig 2001, 800), 
and radically revisit (Balibar 2013, 18) rights as an exercise of fidelity and renewal.9 We ‘have 
to recognise the tangible improvements that human rights, solidarity and development have 
achieved’ (Douzinas and Gearty 2014, 9). However, if rights is ‘the necessary and impossible 
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claim of law to justice’ (Douzinas 2000), then it also serves as ‘the utopian futural aspect of 
law’ (Douzinas 2000). Thus, human rights, as the promise of law underlying justice, will always 
be within and beyond the law, as well as inside and outside of procedure. Therefore, given the 
assimilation of rights into jurocratic praxes that serve to reproduce injustices, as highlighted by 
rights critiques, retreating rights should be the prevailing vocation of human rights activists. 
These critiques and paradoxes of rights as un/freedoms surfaced throughout the findings of the 
study. 
The second theme relates to how students, within their own subjective location as rights 
bearers of codified rights, employ these rights in ‘the democratic legal relations [of] deliberative 
equality’ (Honneth 2012, 49). Even as they sense and experience the suffocating effects of 
rights on social activism, they make tactical choices on how to employ rights on the basis of 
their intuition that it should and could do more. In essence, students prefer to operate in the 
fluid space between formalised and pre-theoretical understandings for human rights. 
Nevertheless, we suspect that even as Honneth (ibid.) ponders the ‘limits of contemporary 
proceduralism’, he does not go far enough in considering human rights critiques in his 
theoretical positions. 
The third theme emerging from the findings is the centrality of the rights to ‘equality’ and 
‘human dignity’ in students’ pre-theoretical framings of human rights. Human rights, in its 
formalised constructions, are, without doubt, folded into global contemporary politics and 
democratic practice. It is constitutive of the police, as evident in Rancière’s (2004a, 28) logic: 
 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of 
collectivities is achieved, the organisation of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the 
systems for legitimising this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and 
legitimisation another name. I propose to call it the police.  
 
As part of a legitimating ‘set of procedures’, one may say human rights have become a central 
ruse within present theories and practice of democracy. The point of policing is ‘to prevent the 
active expression of equality by those who are not in charge of their political lives’ (May 2008, 
47). The concept of equality features as the apex of Rancière’s political philosophy (see May 
2008), serving as a presupposition of democratic politics and the invocation of dissensus ‘from 
the current social order’ (May 2008, 43). The presupposition of equality disrupts the police; and 
it interrupts policing. It calls to retreat rights in order to work against its policing functions. 
Moser (2012)10 argues: ‘Equality seems to be an intuitive aspect of our thinking’, while 
Habermas (2010) suggests that our intuition tells us that human dignity has always been the 
morally-charged demand that underwrites the human rights discourse. Apparently, students are 
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aware that the limits of codified rights can be challenged and overcome by recourse to the pre-
theoretical sources inherent in the demands for equality and human dignity as a way to radically 
revisit rights. 
On a similar logical track as the first three themes, the fourth argument that emerged 
suggests that students simultaneously affirm and disclaim rights; they want to be inside and 
outside rights at one and the same time. One way of approaching this ‘contradiction’ is to argue 
it through Rancière’s (2004b) notion of the police that functions to present state authority as the 
terminal point of political consciousness which disallows the materialisation of political 
outsides (Keet 2014). Thus, a politics next to the state or outside the state are both 
incomprehensible. Therefore, as constitutive of the police, if conventionally understood, human 
rights can contribute to this disallowance; and thus, the non-appearance of its own outsides. 
However, the praxes of students captured within the formulations of their own understandings 
of human rights that simultaneously affirm and reject human rights, can only become 
intelligible by considering the continual interplay between codified and pre-theoretical 
understandings of human rights via human rights critiques. In addition to the notion of police 
that helps us think about human rights insides and outsides, Rancière’s (2011) concept of 
dissensus is equally important. Dissensus refers to the idea that if politics is based on the human 
capacity of speaking and discussing, this capacity is split up from the very beginning. It follows 
that this split-up capacity of speaking and discussing always already generate human rights 
insides and outsides in the way in which agents choose to employ rights. That is, Rancière wants 
to put forward, in the most direct formulation of his idea of dissensus as far as human right are 
concerned, a division in the common sense of human rights; to release us from its blinding 
obviousness, to retreat it (Du Preez and Becker 2016). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Retrospectively, the general route of the study seems – at least partially – to postulate one 
interpretive scheme for making sense of student experiences that gave rise to the contemporary 
student protests in South Africa whose causes are both overdetermined and understudied. 
Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to suggest that the sources of the justice demands11 
articulated by students reside in a pre-theoretical praxis that have the retreatment of rights in 
mind. As this research at least is highlighting parts of the aporetic nature of rights, its infinite 
perplexities and paradoxes, we may already be in a position to better grasp why students want 
to be inside and outside human rights at one and the same time. Whilst codified rights, the 
rights insides, do allow for productive forms of social activism, students also source the basis 
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for activism in their pre-theoretical understandings of rights, human rights outsides, which 
according to the findings of the first two phases of the research project, have a more pronounced 
justice-orientation than its insides. 
In terms of student participation in the life of universities, a range of structures and 
processes make provision for rights and duties within the parameters of a deliberative model.12 
This model, as phase one of our study demonstrates (Keet and Nel 2016), is questioned because 
of its proceduralist and regulatory inclinations that seem to constrain student leaders’ 
expression of citizenship as action. The idea of rights as un/freedoms stems from students’ 
claims to be inside and outside of human rights at one and the same time. To be inside of human 
rights is to work with its calculable democratic advantages. To be outside of human rights is 
not a rejection of rights; rather it is to extend rights’ promise of justice beyond its own limits, 
to paraphrase Derrida in the words of Haddad (2013, 48).  
The calculable democratic advantages of rights, expressed as broad-based student 
participation in governance and university life in this instance, also regulate the form and 
function of student protests. For instance, there is the responsibility to deliberate and the right 
to protest, but in a specific way that is usually prescribed by law, policy, regulations and codes 
of conduct which are crucial for the pragmatic functioning of universities.  
Nevertheless, if we become mindful of the aporetic nature of rights, we may be able to see 
how rights, facilitate freedom and over-regulation; as is also the case in the over-regulation of 
student participation regimes (Keet and Nel 2016). This suggests that we are yet to generate 
praxes, including management practices, where the quantifiable benefits of rights are 
continuously expanded, and not constrained, by human rights outsides. A praxis that is of 
necessity both burdened by pragmatism and unburdened by justice-imaginations and allows for 
regulated and non-regulated (not violent), yet productive change. On this score, both the 
understandings and teachings of human rights that are expressed in human rights praxes would 
require thoughtful and radical renewal with pragmatic import. 
 
NOTES 
1. Andre Keet and Willy Nel started the formal research project in 2013; they were joined by Sahar 
D. Sattarzadeh in 2016.  
2. This is understood to be the capacity to exercise rights and responsibilities, the proficiency to express 
membership, and the competencies to participate and claim recognition as argued by Lister et al. (2007) 
3. International human rights non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International (AI) 
are most known for their extensive human rights campaigns around the globe even though they 
are all Western-based. These organisations have recorded many successes based on a rights-based 
approach.  
4. Gutto (2001, 7–11) refers to more than fifty laws that were enacted between 1994 and 2000 in the 
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areas of equality, land, housing, natural resources, environment, development, education, labour, 
health, sports, recreation, culture and welfare. In each of these sectors, non-discrimination and the 
promotion of equal rights form the foundation. 
5. Honneth (1995b, 93): Chapter five of The Struggle for Recognition. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Columbia Law School offers as course in ‘Critical Human Rights Theory’. More information is 
available at: http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/sections/19707. 
8. Costas Douzinas, ‘Seven Theses on Human Rights: (5) Depoliticisation’, Critical Legal Thinking: 
Law and the Political (blog), 31 May 2013, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/31/seven-
theses-on-human-rights-5-depoliticisation/. 
9. This notion is most evident in the reflections and chapters complied in The Meanings of Rights: The 
Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights (Douzinas and Gearty 2014).  
10. Andreas Moser, ‘Equality Versus Sufficiency’, The Happy Hermit (blog), 21 May 2012, 
https://andreasmoser.blog/2012/05/21/equality-versus-sufficiency/. 
11. Although fallist students’ demands within and across universities are not necessarily unified in 
their visions and motivations (Ebrahim 2016), there are some common calls for justice shared 
across FMF movements, including, but not limited to: the guarantee of free higher education for 
all; ‘decolonisation’ of higher education institutions; freedom and the right to protest without 
disciplinary consequences; a cancellation of all student debt; an end to outsourcing of service 
workers; and the removal of privatised police and security from university and college campuses.  
12. Koen, Cele and Libhaber (2006) observe that the underlying assumptions of the higher education 
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